How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror. By Bevin Alexander

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jmh/summary/v067/67.3sieg.html

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

The Journal of Military History 67.3 (2003) 924-925

How Wars Are Won: The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror. By Bevin Alexander. New York: Crown Publishers, 2002. ISBN. 0-6096-1039-2. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Pp. 401. $25.95.

In this book, Alexander continues his series of popular works on military strategy. While the general nature of his works may give the serious student of strategy and doctrine some pause, no such caution should concern even those most skilled and experienced in the art of warfare. Given the nature of the present international situation, the rules have high relevance. The author devotes a chapter to each item. Alexander has not pontificated in his elaboration of his rules. However, he does allow that the dictums are in fact situational, as it is the manner of implementing such rules that is key.
Alexander's thirteen rules are:

• Strike at an enemy's weakness—An obvious target is an opponent's most vulnerable point. But there are important corollaries: terrorists have forgotten the basic supposition that in accordance with attacking an enemy's weakness, one must nullify his strengths; the unpredictability as to when and where irregular forces would next stage assaults leaves some vulnerable; and mobility will nullify an application of overwhelming force.

• Induce a defense and then attack—Successful defensive warfare avoids surprises and symmetries in tactics. Turning a defensive standoff into offensive action will often result in a rout of the original attacker.

• Hold one place while striking another—Convergent assault that could include feigning and deception can achieve the maximum effect. But in defense of such assaults, commanders must plan for such surprises.

• Feign retreat—This tactic is executed by giving the impression that one's forces are engaged in a panicked retreat, which causes pursuing elements to become overly enthusiastic and consequently isolated from larger units. To this end, they can be more easily annihilated. Covert action teams are especially useful in determining when to terminate the deceit and when to counter-attack.

• Position centrally—If an army can be placed between segments of a larger force, it has an improved likelihood of defeating these reduced elements and thus by extension the entire force overall. Mobility, the lack of long lines of communication, and aerial insertion can make this rule's implementation very effective.

• Use superior weaponry—Reference is made not only to the deterrent power manifested by possession of such weapons but more significantly to the willingness to use them. When advanced weapons and tactics have been ignored, defeat is inevitable.

• Destroy an adversary's will—Ultimate victory can only be achieved through destruction of the ability of an enemy to resist. A leader must be prepared to defeat the will of an enemy. Such a strategy has special utility in cases where occupation of enemy territory follows a conflict.

• Block the enemy's retreat—An enemy force will be destroyed if his avenues for supply and withdrawal are cut off. Modern forces still can be blocked if the airstrips are destroyed, thereby preventing any resupply or evacuation.

• Apply overwhelming force—For optimal effectiveness, power must be concentrated at a specific spot. Perhaps the most well-known use of this approach was in Admiral Nelson's spectacular victory at Trafalgar, which began when he drove into the center of the French fleet behind its vanguard and obliterated the first ships.

• Penetrate a weak point—Instead of attempting to outflank an enemy, a bold assault on a weak point can succeed. If one does not exist, then it can be created. When his enemy vacated the heights to pursue the apparently weak French units down the line, Napoleon took the area and then successfully pressed forward into the breach he had developed.

• Swarm the enemy—In what Alexander terms the "cauldron battle," enemy troops must be enveloped on all sides and any retreat prevented. The effectiveness of the "cauldron" does not necessarily mean that the enemy has been totally annihilated; merely that he has been compelled to abandon his positions. Irregulars also could effectively use cauldron theory when they...